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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLYING DIAMOND OIL 
CORPORATION, formerly known 
as FLYING DIAMOND CORPORATION, 
A Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a 
limited partnership; RALPH 
M. NEWTON, EUGENE M. NEWTON 
and SCOTT F. NEWTON, general 
partners; and EUGENE B. NEWTON, 
individually, and EDNA ELLIOTT 
NEWTON, his wife, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
and 
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION 
CO., a Texas corporation, 
Intervenor 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 19178 
BRIEF OF BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the conflicting claims of the parties to moneys paid on the 
production of oil and gas from certain lands in Summit County, Utah. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The case was tried to the district court with out a jury and judgment was 
entered dividing the moneys paid on production: one-fourth to the plaintiff Flying 
Diamond Oil Corporation, one-fourth to the Newton defendants and one-half to the 
defendant Bass Enterprises Production Co. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Bass seeks affirmance of the judgment of the district court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The lands involved in this lawsuit were part of a grant to the Union Pacific 
Railroad. In 1971 the Newtons owned the railroad lands and the railroad's 
subsidiary, Champlin Petroleum Corporation, owned the oil and gas in those lands. 
The Newtons and Champlin entered into an agreement, hereinafter the "Surface
 { 
Owners Agreement", by which Champlin was given an easement to enter upon the 
surface of the railroad lands, to drill for oil and gas and to construct and maintain 
facilities for the production of oil and gas from the lands. (Section 1 of the j 
Surface Owner's Agreement. A copy of the agreement is attached to the pretrial 
order (R. 276, 285) and is an exhibit to the Flying Diamond brief.) 
Champlin agreed to pay to the Newtons, with certain exceptions that are not < 
material, the value of 2 1/2% "of all the oil and gas and associated liquid 
hydrocarbons hereinafter produced, saved and marketed" from the railroad lands, 
< 
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hereinafter the "2 1/2% payment", "so long as Champlin is receiving" production or 
royalties from the lands. (Section 2 of the Surface Owner's Agreement; R. 289.) 
Sections 3 and 5 of the Surface Owner's Agreement provide for payments to 
be made by an operator under a unitization agreement for the construction and 
maintenance of certain facilities and payments for damage to land, buildings and 
growing crops. Moneys received under Sections 3 and 5 of the agreement are not 
involved in this lawsuit. 
Section 7 of the Surface Owner's Agreement contains the following provision 
with respect to the payments to be made by Champlin (R. 290-291): 
Subject to the provisions of Section 9 hereof, it is agreed 
that the covenants to pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3 and 
5 hereof shall be covenants running with the surface ownership of 
the described premises and shall not be held or transferred 
separately therefrom, and any sums payable under this agreement 
shall be paid to the person or persons owning the surface of the 
described premises as of the date the oil or gas or associated 
liquid hydrocarbon production is marketed. Champlin shall not, 
however, become obligated to make such payments to any 
subsequent purchaser of the described premises and shall continue 
to make such payments to the Land Owner until the first day of 
the month following the receipt by Champlin of notice of change 
of ownership, consisting of the original or certified copies of the 
instrument or instruments constituting a complete chain of title 
from the Land Owner to the party claiming such ownership, and 
then only as to payments thereafter made. 
Section 9 of the Surface Owner's Agreement provides for the continuation of 
the agreement in force and effect so long as there is production of oil and gas 
from the railroad lands. (R. 291.) 
The Champlin agreement was recorded on October 1, 1971. (R. 285.) 
The following year, the Newtons executed a warranty deed, dated February 1, 
1972, purporting to convey and assign to Bass, in paragraph I. B. of the deed: 
-<u 
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One-half of the royalty (of any type) from production 
of minerals that the Grantor actually receives or is entitled 
to receive until February 1, 2072, from the following des-
cribed land: 
SEE EXHIBIT "B" ATTACHED, * * * 
(A copy of the Newton deed is attached to the pretrial order (R. 293-294) and is 
an exhibit to the Flying Diamond brief.) 
The land described in Exhibit B to the Newton deed includes all of the 
railroad lands involved in this lawsuit and in the Champlin agreement. The deed 
also deals with other lands in which the Newtons owned the minerals (Paragraph I. 
A and Exhibit A to the deed) which lands and minerals are not involved in this 
lawsuit. 
The Newtons1 deed to Bass was recorded on March 20, 1972. (R. 293.) 
Later, in 1974, the Newtons were approached by Flying Diamond who wanted 
to buy the ranch and their mineral rights. As to the mineral rights, the then 
principals of Flying Diamond were told by the Newtons that they had sold to Bass 
"50 per cent of the two and a half per cent that the railroad paid on their 
sections." (Tr. 64.)* Scott Newton testified that "we come to the agreement that 
they would take a quarter of what was left of the half, and we would keep a 
quarter." (Tr. 65.) 
Ralph Newton testified of the negotiations with the principals of Flying 
Diamond as follows (Tr. 80, 81): 
* * * that when we first started negotiating with Flying 
Diamond we were going to keep all the mineral interests, 
* References to "Tr." are to the reporter's transcript of the trial, the first 
page of which is numbered as R. 526. 
- A -
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railroad included, but they said they wouldn't buy the pro-
perty without 50 per cent of our interests in both categories 
there and so if we had to let it all go we wouldn't have sold 
and they said if they didn't get a fourth of it, why, they 
wouldn't buy, so we came to, we thought, a happy medium 
there. 
V * * * • ' * • • 
Well, we just pointed out that the two and a half per 
cent would be cut three ways, Bass Enterprises had 50 per 
cent of it and we had 50 per cent, Flying Diamond would 
get a fourth of it and we would get a fourth and they were 
satisfied with that. 
On or about April 24, 1974, Flying Diamond agreed to buy from the Newtons 
their lands including the railroad land involved in this lawsuit and also "one-half of 
their oil, gas and other mineral rights and estates." (Paragraph 6 at page 4 of the 
contract, hereinafter the "Ranch Purchase Contract," a copy of which is attached 
to the pretrial order; R. 298.) 
The "mineral rights and estates" purchased by Flying Diamond are also 
referred to, in paragraph 6 of the Ranch Purchase contract as a "mineral interest" 
which includes, in subparagraph 6 (a) (2), in the same language used in paragraph I. 
B of the Newton deed (supra p. 4): 
One-half of the royalty (of any type) from the produc-
tion of minerals that the Seller actually receives, or is 
entitled to receive from the Property so designated in 
Attachment A-l until January 1, 2073. * * * 
The property referred to in subparagraph 6 (a) (2) of the Ranch Purchase 
Contract is four of the six sections of railroad land involved in the Surface 
Owner's Agreement and in the Newtons1 deed to Bass. Flying Diamond obtained an 
option to purchase the other two sections of railroad land. The Newtons' interest 
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in the 2 1/2% payment was the only mineral interest of any type that the Newtons 
had in the railroad lands. (Tr. 75-76.) 
After the Ranch Purchase Contract was executed, oil was discovered on the 
railroad lands. Since the beginning of production, Champlin has remitted to Flying 
Diamond and the latter has retained all of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment. 
(R. 279.) 
When the Newtons claimed a share in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment, 
Flying Diamond filed this lawsuit to obtain, among other things, a determination 
under Count I of its complaint that Flying Diamond could keep all of the proceeds 
of the payment. (R. 1.) Bass intervened to assert its claim to one-half of the 
moneys received. (R. 147.) In response to a request for admissions, the Newtons 
admitted that the effect of their deed was to assign to Bass one-half of the 2 
1/2% payment. (R. 270-272.) 
Champlin, although it knew of the lawsuit, did not intervene. 
At the trial on the issue in Count I, Flying Diamond stated its general 
objection "to any testimony being received with respect to the surface owners 
agreement on the grounds it violates the parole evidence rule." (Tr. 59; and see 
Tr. 33.) No objection was made to the receipt of evidence regarding the Newton's 
deed or the Ranch Purchase Contract. 
Despite its general objection, Flying Diamond introduced (Tr. 90) the deposi-
tion testimony of Robert Lagerstrom, Champlinfs land manager. In addition to Mr. 
Lagerstrom's testimony about the purpose of the agreement, quoted at pages 9 and 
10 of Flying Diamond's brief, his testimony on the following points was received 
- A -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without objection (Tr. 94): (1) that it would not matter to Champlin if a landowner 
entered into an agreement with somebody else to share the 2 1/2% payment with 
them after it was received from Champlin (deposition p. 30); (2) that in his 
opinion a judgment creditor of the landowner could reach the landowners interest 
in the 2 1/2% payment (deposition p. 39); (3) that the business purpose for Section 
7 in the Surface Owner's Agreement was to avoid difficulties in making payments 
to surface owners in situations where there are "many, many town lots (deposition 
p. 53); and (4) if the current landowner were to agree to share the 2 1/2% 
payment with someone else after receiving it from Champlin, Champlin would have 
no objection (deposition pp. 55-56). 
Counsel for the Newtons and for Bass offered certain pages of the deposi-
tion-testimony of William B. Collister and Flying Diamond's counsel asked the 
court to read additional pages from the deposition. (R. 88-89.) Mr. Collister 
testified in his deposition that he drafted the Newtons1 deed to Bass to cover the 
2 1/2% payment, which he referred to as a "royalty", and, in addition, to cover 
other mineral rights that might be involved in possible future litigation in Utah 
based upon the decision in Radke v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 334 P. 2d 1077 
(Colo. 1959). (Collister deposition pp. 21-22.) Mr. Collister said that by the 
words "entitled to receive," used in paragraph I. B of the deed, he had intended to 
anticipate a situation where the railroad might not recognize rights to which the 
surface owner would be entitled (Collister deposition p. 51.) 
The only witnesses at the trial were Scott and Ralph Newton who testified, 
supra, pp. 4-5, that the Flying Diamond principals had agreed to a one-fourth share 
of the 2 1/2% payment. 
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No one testified for Flying Diamond. No evidence was offered that Flying 
Diamond intended to acquire a greater interest in the "mineral rights and estates" 
on the railroad lands than the one-fourth interest provided for in paragraph 6 of 
the Ranch Purchase Contract. 
The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 526) 
including findings of fact Nos. 6 and 9 that it was the intent of the Newtons and 
Bass that Bass acquire one-half of the 2 1/2% payment and that it was the intent 
of the Newtons and Flying Diamond that Flying Diamond acquire one-fourth of the 
2 1/2% payment (R. 428). A final judgment was entered that Flying Diamond is 
entitled to one-fourth, the Newtons to one-fourth and Bass to one-half of the 2 
1/2% payment. (R. 460.) 
ARGUMENT 
" •
 l 
BASS IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF 
OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE 2 1/2% 
PAYMENT 
This lawsuit is an effort by Flying Diamond to keep all of the proceeds of 
the 2 1/2% payment after it agreed with the Newtons, with knowledge of the prior 
assignment to Bass, to take a one-fourth interest. There are several reasons why 
this effort must fail. 
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A. A share in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment is inherently assign-
able;—Champlin promised to pay the Newtons the value of 2 1/2% of all the oil 
and gas "produced, saved and marketed," from the railroad lands. (Section 2 of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement.) The Newtons, in effect, were granted a share in the 
benefit that Champlin would receive from the production of its minerals. That 
share, the 2 1/2% payment, while not an estate in the minerals, is a share of 
production of minerals and, therefore, by definition, a royalty. Williams and 
Meyers, Oil And Gas Terms, p. 213 (1957). See also the discussions in Picard v. 
Richards, 366 P. 2d 119, 122-123 (Wyo. 1961), and in Jones, Exercise of Executive 
Rights In Connection With Non-Participating Royalty And Non-Executive Mineral 
Interests, 15 S.W. Inst. Oil and Gas L. & Tax., pp. 35, 38, 52, 54, (1964), from 
which it appears that the Newtons* share was analogous to, if it was not, a 
"nonparticipating" royalty interest. As with other property interests, a royalty is 
assignable. Callahan v. Martin, 43 P. 2d 788 (Cal. 1935); Oil And Gas Terms, p. 
213, supra. 
"The grant of a royalty interest leaves in the grantor [Champlin] a mineral 
estate burdened by an incorporeal hereditament in the nature of common-law 
rent." 2 Williams and Meyers, Oil And Gas Lawt §§ 324.4, 338 pp. 56, 195 (1981). 
Unaccrued rents are assignable and may be assigned to someone other than the 
transferee of the reversion. Such an assignment would prevent the transfer of the 
unaccrued rent to a purchaser of the reversion who has knowledge of the assign-
ment. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord And Tenant, §§ 515, 528. 
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The 2 1/2% payment is to be made in money. The right to money due or to 
become due in the future is assignable, Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson 
Trucking Co., 23 U. 2d 115, 458 P. 2d 873, 875 (1969), even when the contract 
itself is not, Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co,, 182 P. 2d 182, 185 (Cal. 1947). 
B. The right to the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment is separable from the 
ownership of the railroad lands;—Flying Diamond's argument (Br. 17-24) that the 
right to the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment is inseparable from the surface 
ownership of the railroad lands was rejected in an analogous situation in Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Shepard, 62 N.E. 154 (N.Y. 1901). In that case, Western 
Union owned and later sold certain property which, through mesne conveyances, 
came to be owned by the defendant Shepard. The original grant by Western Union 
to Shephard's predecessor in title had contained the following reservation of claims 
for damage to the property: 
* * * [Western Union] reserves all claim or right of action 
against the Metropolitan and Manhattan Elevated Railroad 
Companies, or either of them, for any and all injury or 
damage done to the aforesaid property, or to the value or 
uses thereof, in the past, present, or future, by reason of 
the construction and operation of the elevated railroad in 
front of the said premises, and as they are now constructed 
and operated. 
The defendant Shephard was aware of the reservation, but nevertheless sued the 
railroad and obtained a judgment for damages to the property. (See 62 N.E. at p. 
151.) In an action by Western Union to recover the damages received by Shephard, 
he argued that he should keep the damages because they were inseparable from 
the fee which he owned and were, in effect, a payment for an easement over his 
land. The Supreme Court of New York rejected the argument as follows (62 N.E. 
at p. 156): 
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The inseparability of land from its easements is there-
fore immaterial. We are not now dealing with the non-
assignability of the easement apart from the land, but with 
the money about to be handed over—proceeds of the dam-
ages done to the land by a trespass upon its easements. The 
distinction is clear between the equitable right to the pro-
ceeds of the injury and the legal title to the thing or right 
injured. Thus it was competent for the grantor and grantee 
to agree that a part of the consideration of the land convey-
ed should consist of the money damages thereafter to be 
recovered from the trespassers. 
To paraphrase the Western Union Telegraph opinion, we are not now dealing 
with the nonassignability of Champlin's easement apart from the railroad lands. 
We are here dealing with money that Champlin has handed over for its use of the 
land. Flying Diamond has ignored the distinction between the equitable right to 
the proceeds of the use of the land and the legal title to the land itself. Thus it 
was competent for Flying Diamond, as part of its consideration for the railroad 
lands, to agree to take less than all of Champlin's payment for the use of those 
lands. 
C. The Surface Owner's Agreement does not preclude an assignment of a 
share in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment:—Much is said by Flying Diamond 
about covenants running with the land in an effort to argue Champlin's alleged 
concerns in the Surface Owner's Agreement. (Br. 17-18) A covenant is a promise 
and the only covenant or promise in the agreement so far as the 2 1/2% payment 
is concerned is the promise of Champlin to make the payment to whoever happens 
to be the surface owner, according to Champlin's records, when the oil and gas is 
marketed, as spelled out in Section 7 of the agreement. The judgment of the 
district court that each of the parties may share in the proceeds of the payment 
does not alter Champlinfs "burden" of payment in any way. 
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By Section 1 of the Surface Owner's Agreement Champlin obtained the right 
to go upon the railroad lands and nothing in the judgment diminishes that right or 
"benefit" in any way. 
The burden and the benefit of Champlin in relation to the surface owner, 
whoever that may be at any given time, are simply not altered by any sharing in 
the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment. 
Turning to Flying Diamond's argument regarding Restatement (Second) Of 
Contracts, § 317 (2) (a), (Br. 23-24), there is no evidence to support its argument 
that "a diversion of remittances"-—actually a sharing in the proceeds—would 
materially impair Champlin's chance of obtaining return performance [right to go 
on the land] or reduce the value of the Surface Owner's Agreement to Champlin. 
There being no words in the Surface Owner's Agreement precluding an 
assignment of a share in the proceeds, Flying Diamond's argument (Br. 23) based 
upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 317 (2) (c), is not in point. An 
unexpressed intention on Champlin's part to preclude any assignment of a share in 
the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment would not be recognized. 4 Corbin on 
Contracts, S 873, p. 494 (1951); 3 Williston, Law of Contracts, § 422, (1981); 
Allhusen v. Caristo, 303 N.Y 446, 103 N.E. 2d 891 (1952). 
Even if the Surface Owner's Agreement had been written to preclude assign-
ment of a share in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment, such a provision, after 
Champlin has made the payment, would not affect the rights and obligations of the 
Newtons, Bass and Flying Diamond. Restatement (Second) Of Contracts, S 322 (2) 
(b) (1981); 3 Williston, Law of Contracts, S 422 at pp. 140-41 (1960); Stark v. 
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National Research & Design Corp., 110 A. 2d 143 (N.J. 1954); Johnston v. 
Landucci, 130 P. 2d 405 (Cal. 1942). 
In Stark, supra, the plaintiff was the lessee of an office under a lease which 
contained a covenant against an assignment of the lease. The plaintiff assigned 
her interest in the lease to the defendant who subsequently refused to pay rent to 
the plaintiff. The defendant argued that since an assignment to him was precluded 
by the lease, the plaintiff could not recover rent from him. The court noted that 
the benefit of the covenant ran only to the lessor and that the defendant, as an 
assignee of the lessee, gained no benefit from the covenant. 
In the context of government contracts, wherein contractors are specifically 
precluded by statute from assigning moneys to become due under a contract, it has 
been consistently held that the restriction on assignment is solely for the benefit 
of the government and does not affect the legal rights of the assignor and the 
assignee as between themselves. If a prohibition against assignment had been 
placed in the Surface Owner's Agreement, that prohibition would have to "be 
interpreted in the light of its purpose to give protection to" Champlin. "After 
payments have been collected and are in the hands of the" surface owner "with 
notice, assignments may be heeded, at all events, in equity if they will not 
frustrate the ends to which the prohibition was directed." Martin v. National 
Surety, 300 U.S. 588, 596 (1937); Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v. 
Welles, 242 U.S. 7 (1916). 
The point of law involved here is summarized in, 3 Williston, Law of Con-
tracts, § 422 at p. 140, (1960) as follows: 
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A prohibition of assignment or a condition restricting 
performance of the debtors obligation to the original pro-
misee is intended for the benefit of the debtor and cannot 
affect the legal or equitable rights of the assignor and 
assignee as between themselves. 
There being no expressed prohibition of assignment in the Surface Owner's 
Agreement, Flying Diamond's allegations of a detriment to Champlin (Br. 14, 23) 
are beside the point. We would only note the testimony of Champlin's land 
manager, Mr. Lagerstrom, who said as to Section 7 of the agreement, that in his 
view, Champlin would have no objection if a landowner agreed to share the 2 1/2% 
payment with someone else after receiving the money from Champlin. (Lager- .,, ^ 
strom deposition, pp. 55-56.) 
D. The Newton's deed to Bass was effective to assign a one-half share in 
the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment:—Whether the 2 1/2% payment is "a property i 
interest in the oil and gas"—and Flying Diamond says it is not (Br. 31)~is not an 
issue in this lawsuit. The Newtons have admitted that they intended the deed to 
cover the 2 1/2% payment. (R. 426, Fdg. No. 6; R. 270-272.) The 2 1/2% \ 
payment was the only interest the Newtons had in the railroad lands apart from 
their ownership of the surface. (Tr. 75-76.) Mr. Collister testified that the 2 
1/2% payment was a subject of the "royalty (of any type)" language in part I. B of { 
the deed. (Collister deposition, p. 48.) This evidence is admissible to identify the 
subject matter of paragraph I. B of the Newtons1 deed. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence 
S 1040. When the time came for Flying Diamond to acquire a share of the < 
payment, the same words "a royalty (of any type) from production of minerals" 
were used in the Ranch Purchase Contract. 
The payment is certainly a royalty of some type, supra, p. 9, and the ( 
reference in the Newtons1 deed to a "royalty (of any type) from the production of 
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minerals" is adequate to describe the payment. Clearly, the district court's 
Conclusion of Law No. 3 (R. 426) that the Newtons1 deed accomplished the 
intended assignment is correct. 
Flying Diamond argues (Br. 24, 26) that the assignment to Bass of a share in 
the 2 1/2% payment must fail because the Newtons are no longer "entitled" to the 
2 1/2% payment. The evidence as to the meaning of the word "entitled", is 
Collister's testimony that the word was used in paragraph I. B of the Newton's 
deed to cover other additional mineral rights that the railroad might not 
recognize. (Supra, p. 7.) The part of the Newtons1 deed quoted (Br. 26), rather 
than being a recognition of the "severability problem", is a clear indication that 
the Newtons and Bass believed that shares in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment 
were assignable and wished to make certain that future assignments would be 
recognized. 
Flying Diamond's argument based upon Restatement (Second) Of Contracts, § 
320, presumes the ultimate issue in the lawsuit. Since the Newtons1 right to the 2 
1/2% payment arose upon the execution of the Surface Owner's Agreement, there 
was nothing conditional about that right which would preclude an assignment to 
Bass. 
II 
FLYING DIAMOND IS ESTOPPED TO DENY 
THAT IT HAS ONLY A ONE-FOURTH INTEREST 
IN THE PROCEEDS OF THE 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT 
The Newtons testified (Tr. 75) that the only mineral interest which they had 
in the railroad land when they contracted with Flying Diamond, was a one-half 
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interest in the 2 1/2% payment. (Tr. 64, 65, 80, 81.) The testimony of Scott and 
Ralph Newton (Tr. 64) shows that Flying Diamond was told of the Newtons1 deed 
to Bass and agreed to a one-fourth share of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment. 
This evidence is admissible to identify the subject matter of paragraph 6 (a) (2) of 
the Ranch Purchase Contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d., Evidence § 1040. The deed had 
been recorded. (R. 293.) It is obvious that the language used in the Ranch 
Purchase Contract to describe the interest Flying Diamond was purchasing from 
the Newtons is virtually identical to the language used in the Newtons1 deed to 
describe the share in the 2 1/2% payment assigned to Bass. The deed to Bass 
contains the following language: 
One-half of the royalty (of any type) from production 
of minerals that Grantor actually receives or is entitled to 
receive until February 1, 2072, * * * 
which is tracked in paragraph 6 (a) (2) of the Ranch Purchase Contract as follows: 
One-half of the royalty (of any type) from the produc-
tion of minerals that the Seller actually receives or is en-
titled to receive from the property so designated in attach-
ment A-l until January 1, 2073. * * * 
No evidence was offered that Flying Diamond intended to acquire more than 
a one-fourth share in the 2 1/2% payment. Flying Diamond's argument (Brief, p. 
37) that Finding of Fact No. 9 is unsupported because there is no extrinsic 
evidence of Flying Diamond's subjective intent ignores the rule that subjective 
intent is not relevant. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P. 2d 653 (Utah 1979). 
The district court's Finding of Fact is that (R. 526): 
9. It was the intent of Newtons to transfer to Fly-
ing Diamond and the intent of Flying Diamond to acquire 
one-fourth of the 2 1/2% payment. 
Clearly, the Finding of Fact is supported by the evidence. 
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Flying Diamond argues that paragraph 6 (a) (2) of the Ranch Purchase 
Contract was mere surplusage at the time it was drafted and has no significance 
in this lawsuit. The district court, however, was obligated, so far as possible, to 
give effect to all of the language of the contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts 
§ 259. Consistent with that obligation the district court's Conclusion of Law No. 7 
states as follows (R. 426): 
7. Flying Diamond is estopped to deny that it has 
only a one-fourth interest in the 2 1/2% payment. 
This conclusion of law is based upon principles of equitable estoppel. Those 
considerations estop Flying Diamond from now asserting that it acquired the right 
to all of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment. Dillon Inv. Co. v. Kiniken, 241 P. 
2d 493 (Kan. 1952). The equitable considerations involved in this case are 
reviewed in 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel And Waiver, § 13, where the following is 
stated: 
Strictly speaking, estoppel by deed does not ordinarily 
apply to the grantee. A grantee who accepts a deed is, 
however, estopped in certain respects. Estoppel of the gran-
tee of a deed, viewed generally, is of the nature of equit-
able estoppel rather than technical estoppel by deed, since 
the estoppel is not predicated primarily on the execution of 
a formal written instrument which cannot be denied or re-
butted, but rather on the inability of a person, in the eyes 
of the law, to acquiesce in, and enjoy the benefits of, a 
transaction, and at the same time reject the accompanying 
burdens. A person cannot claim under an instrument without 
confirming it. He must found his claim on the whole, and 
cannot adopt that feature or operation which makes it in his 
favor, and at the same time repudiate or contradict another 
which is counter or adverse to it. * * * 
These equitable considerations, will not permit Flying Diamond to claim all 
of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment when the Ranch Purchase Contract, upon 
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which Flying Diamond relies for its title to the railroad lands, granted less than all 
of the proceeds. Russell v. Texas Company, 238 F. 2d 636 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. 
den. 354 U.S. 938. 
In the Russell case, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company had conveyed 
certain lands to plaintiff Russellfs grantor with a reservation of the minerals. 
Russell claimed the minerals on the theory that, because of an Act of Congress, 
the railroad lacked the power to reserve the minerals to itself when it conveyed 
the land. The Ninth Circuit disposed of Russell's claim in the following language 
(238 F. 2d at 640): 
Appellant in the case at bar would have us declare 
void a mineral reservation which appears expressly in the 
very deed through which he, himself, claims title. He as-
serts no independent source of title. On the contrary, he 
insists that the express recitals in the deed to his prede-
cessor in title (of which he had notice) were ineffective 
irrespective of the intentions of the parties to the convey-
ance or the bargain into which they entered. Even if we 
were to resort to hypothesizing, it would, indeed, be diffi-
cult for us to imagine a more obvious case of estoppel. 
* * • * * 
The law is clear that where the grantee of surface 
rights or his successors in interest seek to remove the cloud 
of the grantor's mineral reservation, it must be established 
that the grantee's rights to the interest reserved flow from 
an independent source of title, See 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, S 38 
(f), p. 218. Where, however, the surface owner claims title 
to the mineral rights, which his grantor expressly reserved 
to himself on the theory that his grantor had no right to 
make such a reservation, the owner of the surface is estop-
ped from asserting that the mineral rights thereby passed to 
him in the instrument of conveyance, Morse v. Smyth, D.C. 
1918, 255 F. 981; Wier v. The Texas Co., 5 Cir., 1950, 180 
F. 2d 465. This doctrine has been enunciated in as many 
ways as there are individual factual situations to justify its 
application. Estoppel, in the nature of an equitable concept, 
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is designed to protect the reliances and expectations of 
innocent persons from detrimental devastation by those who 
by assent and recognition have induced those reliances and 
expectations. Whenever the invocation of a rule results in 
the denial of a remedy, caution implicitly governs discretion. 
Caution must give way to reasoned judgment, however, 
where, as in the case at bar, the facts so overwhelmingly 
justify the application of the doctrine. To disregard its 
applicability in this case would be to invite a miscarriage of 
justice. 
Flying Diamond would avoid an estoppel by the assertion that the grant under 
the Ranch Purchase Contract was a quitclaim of any royalty from the railroad 
lands. (R. 37.) This assertion ignores the provision at the beginning of paragraph 
6 of the contract that "the seller [Newton] will execute a Warranty Deed for the" 
interest granted in subparagraph 6 (a) (2). 
More importantly, this case does not involve the technical concept of 
estoppel by deed involved in Flying Diamond's citation, 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel 
And Waiver, S 9. (Br. 37.) Estoppel by deed is concerned with the denial of 
solemn assertions in a deed. The estoppel involved in this case is of the nature of 
equitable estoppel and is concerned with the effort of Flying Diamond to enjoy a 
benefit of the Ranch Purchase Contract—ownership of the railroad lands—and 
avoid the burden of the contract—only a one-fourth interest in the proceeds of 
production from those lands. Of course, Flying Diamond may deny that any estate 
or interest passed to it by the Ranch Purchase Contract but such a denial would 
leave Flying Diamond with no interest in the railroad lands or in the 2 1/2% 
payment. 
As to Flying Diamond's claim of an estoppel by deed (Br. 34), the rule is that 
one who claims an estoppel must have been misled by the deed. 28 Am. Jur. 2d., 
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Estoppel And Waiver, § 10. There is no evidence of innocent reliance and 
expectations on Flying Diamond's part. 
As to the "practical construction" of the Surface Owner's Agreement (Br. 24-
27) all of the parties viewed the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment as assignable, as 
evidenced by paragraph I. B of the Newtons1 deed and paragraph 6 (a) (2) of the 
Ranch Purchase Contract. There was no construction to the contrary until Flying 
Diamond refused to distribute the proceeds. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEESLEY, SPENCER <5c FAIRCLOUGH 
Claron C. Spencer 
Keith W. Meade 
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